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Abstract
The relationship between resale price maintenance and consumer welfare is
explored using the graphical tools of consumer choice theory. Even if it is
assumed that resale price maintenance is introduced for a pro-competitive
end—e.g., manufacturers wish to induce retailers to undertake non-price
intrabrand competition, it is shown that the effects on consiomer welfare
are ambiguous.

No one knows quite what to do about resale price maintenance. The ,
courts and the legislatures have swung from a flat rejection of the
practice before World War I to its active encouragement in the 1930s
and back to complete proscription in the 1970s. Although economists
did not come to consider resale price maintenance till rather late in
the game, they have also found it difficult to speak with one voice on
the practice. There have been passionate defenses of the welfare-
enhancing aspects of resale price maintenance and equally passionate
denunciations, with neither side commanding a consensus.
This note is an attempt to offer a route out of this thicket of
contradictory opinions. But rather than an endorsement of either the
welfare-enhancing or welfare-reducing views of resale price maintenance,
this route offers a compromise verdict: the effects of resale price
maintenance on consumer welfare are ambiguous. To derive this result I
make use of the standard indifference curve analysis of consumer
choice. I apply that tool to the most favorable theory of the welfare-
enhancing aspects of resale price maintenance, namely, the retailer
service theory. Briefly stated, that theory argues that manufacturers
impose a minimum resale price on distribucors in order to encourage
distributors to undertake non-price intrabrand competition, especially
in the provision of product quality information. Without the contrac-
tual specification of a minimum resale price, distributors will be
reluctant to provide consumers with product quality information. Each
will leave that task to other distributors of the same product in the
hope of reaping Che benefits of information dissemination without
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incurring the costs. In those circumstances there will be an under-
provision of product quality information, relative to the social optimum.
The introduction of resale price maintenance will induce distributors
to increase the amount of product quality information offered.
I show that this increase in product quality information does not
necessarily increase consumer welfare. The reason for this is straight-
forward: resale price maintenance simultaneously lowers the price of
product quality information and raises the price of the physical product.
It is, therefore, not possible to predict whether this change in the
relative price of product and information makes the consumer better off,
in the economist's usual sense.
I find, then, that there is no a_ priori way to resolve the disputes
about the effects of resale price maintenance on consumer welfare. The
practice may increase welfare in one market and reduce it in another.
Only an appeal to the facts in each situation will prove a reliable guide
to predicting the relationship between consumer welfare and minimum re-
sale price. " '"' ' ' ' '"-'•
I proceed by first reviewing the Supreme Court's uncertainties and
changes of heart about resale price maintenance. These are offered as
evidence of the proposition that the law does not know quite what to do
about resale price maintenance. Next I briefly review the economic
theoretical literature in order to show that economists, too, are not
of one mind on this topic. I then justify this practical and theoreti-
cal confusion by a graphical analysis of the retailer service theory
and offer some concluding remarks.
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II.
The ambiguous judicial sentiment toward resale price maintenance
may be seen in the Supreme Court's holdings. The Court first spoke on
the practice in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. , 220
U.S. 373 (1911). That action was for damages claimed by a drug manu-
facturer. Dr. Miles, from a wholesaler, John D. Park & Sons Co. Park
had procured the manufacturer's drugs by inducing other wholesalers and
retailers, who had signed resale price maintenance agreements with Dr.
Miles, to sell to him below the minimum price. The Court, in holding
that Miles' original agreements violated the Sherman Act, seemed to
formulate a per se rule against resale price maintenance.
However, eight years later the Court retreated in United States v.
Colgate & Co. , 250 U.S. 300 (1919). In that case the majority ruled
that it did not violate the Sherman Act for a manufacturer to announce
a policy of refusing to deal with retailers who did not comply with his
stipulated minimum retail price and to terminate sales to retailers who
had not maintained support of the manufacturer's resale price mainte-
nance program. The Court perceived that the practice of asking retailers
to adhere to a minimum price could, in the absence of collusion among
retailers or manufacturers, entail cost-efficiencies for a manufacturer
and that the Court would not interpose itself where this reasonable basis
for resale price maintenance existed.
This rule of reason was very sharply restricted forty years later
in the Parke, Davis decision. There it was held that agreements
between a manufacturer and wholesalers which threatened to terminate
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supplies to wholesalers who dealt with non-complying retailers were
illegal:
"When the manufacturer's actions, as here, go beyond
mere announcement of his policy and the simple refusal
to deal, and he employs other means which effect ad-
herence to his resale prices...he has put together a
combination in violation of the Sherman Act."^
The Court felt that it was on different ground from that traversed in
the Colgate decision, a difference summarized by the word "agreement."
The Colgate decision involved a refusal to deal with noncoraplying
resellers, a refusal not flowing from a prior agreement. Parke, Davis
implied that the knowing agreement between a manufacturer and others to
terminate if certain conditions in the future were not fulfilled
constituted a "contract, combination, or conspiracy" in restraint of
trade. This may seem a disingenuous rationale for the Court to have
invoked in order to distinguish the two decisions, but an alternative
explanation for the seeming vacuity of the Court's grounds for reversal
is that it no more understood the competitive effects of resale price
maintenance in 1960 than it had in 1911 or 1919. Where arguments on
3
substance were lacking, those on shadow would have to serve.
III.
Economic theorizing on resale price maintenance reflects the same
4
confusion which has plagued the courts and legislatures. Two leading
theoretical explanations of the practice are the retailer-cartel and
manufacturer-cartel theories. In the first, resale price maintenance
is seen as having been imposed on manufacturers by colluding retailers.
The L'ecailers iilius stifle intrabrand competition and jointly maximize
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thelr profits by securing a minimum resale price above the competitive
price, which price manufacturers would prefer. In the manufacturer
cartel theory, resale price maintenance is seen as a means of aiding
colluding manufacturers to realize joint-maximum profits. The agree-
ments remove a manufacturer's incentive to shade the price at which the
cartel sells to retailers because the price cut cannot be passed on to
the final consumer: the lower price given to the retailer would not
evoke a concomitant increase in quantity sold since the retailer cannot
cut his price to lure customers away from loyal cartel members, and the
manufacturer would simply lose profits. Both of these theories see
resale price maintenance as anti-competitive and, therfore, as tending
to reduce consumer welfare. However, there are reasons for believing
that neither of these theories offers a persuasive explanation of
5
resale price maintenance.
A third theory—the retailer service theory—suggests that resale
price maintenance agreements are a means by which manufacturers induce
5
retailers to engage in non-price intrabrand competition.
Tlie principal means of competition fostered by these agreements is
pre-sale or point-of-sale services, e.g., the use of specialized display
rooms, sales personnel highly knowledgeable about product features,
and product demonstration, collectively called "point-of-sale services."
The contractual specification of a minimum resale price internalizes,
for the retailer, the external benefits provided by his point-of-sale
services. Without such a specification each retailer would attempt to
increase his sales and profits by lowering his output price and allowing
either another retailer or the consumer to incur the costs of acquiring
-6-
product quality information. Under those circumstances very few
retailers would provide consumers with information. This result is
inefficient if retailers are the lowest cost providers of pre-sale
services.
Under resale price maintenance, intrabrand price competition among
retailers is constrained. But this in itself does not necessarily mean
that the practice is anti-competitive. Wnen price competition is
forestalled, retailers will resort to non-price competition in order
to increase sales and profits. They may, for example, expand pre-sale
services to consumers up to the point where the marginal cost of the
last unit of services provided equals the marginal revenue obtained
from those services. Excess profits may be dissipated by non-price
competition, and, if so, the manufacturer's desired level of point-of-
sale service will be established. Retailers should receive no more
than a competitive return on their assets.
Just as the previous two theories suggested the anti-competitive
aspects of resale price maintenance, the retailer service theory main-
tains that the practice is consistent with competitive practices and
will, therefore, increase consumer welfare. Although the conditions
Q
under which this increase will occur have not received much attention,
it has nevertheless been asserted that, since the previous two theories
are untenable and the retailer service theory is at least economically
plausible, resale price maintenance necessarily increases consumer wel-
fare. I attempt to show in what follows that, even when one accepts
the retailer service theory, the ef^^ert of resa.!"? price maintenance on
consumer welfare is uncertain.
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Consider a commodity which consumers purchase relatively infre-
quently and which is sophisticated in the sense that there are numerous
aspects of the good over which consumers have differing tastes, e.g.,
durability, compatability with other commodities, maintenance require-
9
ments, and technical capabilities. Such commodities are often sold
through specialty outlets. Consumers or retailers must expend resources
on acquiring information about such a commodity, and, therefore, some
relative price prevails between the physical commodity and information
.
about that product's quality. This situation is pictured in figure 1.
,
Along the horizontal axis are measured units of product quality infor-
^.
mation or point-of-sale services. These units are labeled POSS.
Units of the physical commodity are measured along the vertical axis
and labeled Q. We nay assume that the typical consumer has a well-
defined preference ordering over all possible combinations of the phy-
sical product and product quality information and that, therefore, the
usual convex indifference curves may be defined over these two aspects
of the commodity. A budget constraint, AB, reflects the consumer's
income and the relative price between physical product and product
quality information. If there were no constraints on the provision of
point-of-sale services by any retailer, e.g., if all retailers were
able to internalize the benefits of the product quality information
they distribute, then the typical consumer would maximize his utility
subject to his budget constraint by purchasing bundle R, which contains
0„ and POSS units of physical product and product quality information.
But this optimum cannot usually be achieved. This is because, as
the retailer service theory argues, retailers cannot economically
,
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Intemalize the benefits of product quality information. In che most
extreme case, pictured in figure 2, retailers will offer no point-of-
sales services at all so that the typical consumer will, in the absence
of alternative supplies of information, have to make do with a corner
solution at point A. His utility is lower than it would be if retailers
could be persuaded to offer even a small amount of product quality
information. Suppose this maximum amount which retailers could econo-
mically offer was POSS. The consumer would be better off than he was
when no information was available, as indicated by his movement to a
higher indifference curve at point S, but still not as well off as he
would be if there were no constraint on the retailer's offer of point-
of-sale services.
It should also be noted that, where retailers are unable to inter-
nalize information's benefits even though they are more efficient pro-
Ariders of information than are consumers, the analysis above suggests
the circumstances under which consumers may undertake to provide their
ovm information. Consider figure 3. There I assume the initial situa-
tion to be like that in figure 2: retailers offer no point-of-sale
services and consumers maximize their utility by reaching indifference
curve U at point A. In figure 3 the possibility that consumers may
provide their own information arises from the presence of budget line
AC, Combinations there represent physical product and consumer-provided
product quality information. Because consumers are less efficient than
are retailers at providing information, AC reflects the fact that the
relative price of product quality information is greater when consumers
provide their own information. It is possible that the consumer will
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maximize utility along a higher indifference curve, U , at point T along
budget line AC. In that case all information is being self-provided
with the consumer turning to the retailer only for the physical product.
Note finally that as in the previous case depicted in figure 2, the con-
sumer is, at T in figure 3, still not as well off as he was in the
unconstrained case of figure 1.
Now we may see how the information of resale price maintenance
affects consumer welfare. The key feature of the plan is that by
raising the resale price and specifying that that price is a minimum,
the manufacturer induces retailers to substitute non-price intrabrand
competition for price competition. In terms of the diagrams above the
important point is that resale price maintenance alters the budget
constraint by simultaneously raising the price of the physical product
and lowering the price of retailer-provided product quality information.
In figure 4 the original budget constraint facing the consumer, AB,
pivots upon the introduction of resale price maintenance to GH.
And what is the effect on consumer welfare? That depends. Figure
5 summarizes the three possibilities: that the consumer's welfare
increases, is left unchanged, and is lowered by the introduction of
resale price maintenance. Assume that initially the consumer's budget
constraint is AB and that, because of the difficulties in internalizing
the benefits of information, retailers are offering a maximum of only
POSS by way of product quality information. The typical consumer reaches
his highest attainable indifference curve at point a on indifference
curve U^. He consumes Q„ units of the physical product and POSS of
point-of-sale services.
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The situation in which resale price maintenance unambiguously
increases consumer welfare is shown along budget line CD. There has
been a small increase in the physical product price relative to the
decrease in the price of product quality information. The consumer is
able to reach a higher indifference curve, U, , at point 6, where he
consumes Q^ units of physical product and POSS units of point-of-sale
services.
A second possibility is that the introduction of resale price main-
tenance leaves consumer welfare unchanged. This occurs along the new
budget constraint EF. This is just tangent to the original indifference
curve. Up., at point y so that the consumer now consumes Q^ units of the
physical product and POSS„ units of the point-of-sale services. Although
the combination of the two aspects of the commodity has altered, the con-
sumer is still at the same utility level.
Lastly, there is the possibility that consumer welfare is reduced
by the introduction of resale price maintenance. This arises along
budget constraint GB in figure 5, where there has been a large increase
in physical product price relative to the lowering of the price of pro-
duct quality information. The highest attainable combination now places
the consumer on a lower indifference curve, U_., , at point 5 where he
consumes Q- units of physical product and POSS. units of product quality
information.
It is not possible, a_ priori , to predict which of these three
results follows the introduction of resale price maintenance for any
given commodity. An investigator must look to the particular facts
in each case. Additional complications may arise in the course of
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detenaining the effects on consumer welfare of a minim-am resale price.
I have assumed a particular preference ordering, but it might be that
a different distribution over consumers of tastes for product quality
information and physical product would affect the predicted results of
the introduction of resale price maintenance. The results might also
be altered by the presence of a wide dispersion of costs among the
retailers who agree with one manufacturer to maintain a minimum retail
price. Finally, the behavior of rival manufacturers of a similar
product, when combined with all the influences noted above, will be an
important determinant of the impact on consumers of resale price main-
tenance by one manufacturer.
1 V .
It has been shown here, using a graphical analysis of consumer
choice, that the effects on consumer welfare of resale price maintenance
are ambiguous. Depending on the circumstances, the practice can make
consumers better off, worse off, or leave their state of well-being
unchanged. The source of the ambiguity is that resale price maintenance
simultaneously raises the price of the physical product and lowers the
price of retailer-supplied product quality information.
This result serves in part to explain the notable lack of. consensus
among courts, legislatures, and economists regarding resale price main-
tenance. Tlie current state of affairs is that fair trade laws are
proscribed and individual manufacturers' schemes to maintain a minimum
resale price are frowned upon as being anti-competitive and, by implica-
tion, detrimencal to consumer welfare. Tne analysis pursued here
suggests that public policy toward resale price maintenance should be
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more circumspect: the practice should be, without further empirical
work in a wide variety of cases, neither encouraged nor forbidden.
Instead, each individual case will have to withstand careful scrutiny
to determine the particular effects on consumer welfare. A more general
conclusion on resale price maintenance must wait until future research
acquaints us with some more systematic relationship between resale price
maintenance, consumer welfare, and various product and market charac-
teristics.
r •'t .* 4
-13-
Footnotes
1,
'ibid., at 44.
362 U.S. 29 (1960).
2,
3
In a parallel set of cases, U.S. v. General Electric , 272 U.S. 476
(1926), and Simpson v. Union Oil Co. , 337 U.S. 13 (1964), the Supreme
Court first condoned and then disallowed resale price maintenance
affected through a consignment arrangement. In Dr. Miles the Court had
invoked the common law rule against restraints on alienation in
resolving the issue of whether there was a common law right on the part
of a manufacturer to impose a minimum retail price on his goods. The
manufacturer, it had been argued, had parted with his title to his goods
and with that title had relinquished his right to dictate the terms of
sale of his retailers. Although the Court did not rely on the doctrine
against unreasonable restraints on alienation in its holding in Dr.
Miles
,
cautious manufacturers may have noted that the Court raised the
issue and might return to it later. Thus, some manufacturers, like
General Electric, affected resale price maintenance, not through pur-
chase agreements with its retailers, but rather by utilizing a consign-
ment system which made all retailers GE's agents. GE thus distinguished
its resale price maintenance scheme from that of Dr. Miles and fore-
stalled a complaint that the scheme violated the ancient rule against
restraints on alienation. Tlie Supreme Court agreed in U.S. v. General
Electric that the consignment plan was not a violation of the Sherman
Act. However, in Simpson v. Union Oil Co.
,
337 U.S. 13 (1964), the
Supreme Couri: reversed itself, just as it had overturned Colgate in
Parke, Davis. Union Oil's consignment system to its retailers served
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to maintain a minimum retail price and was, by virtue of its size and
an element of coercion, held to be anticompetitive. The Court's rea-
soning in Simpson reveals the same lack of focus as had Parke, Davis .
4
A sampling of these opposing views is contained in the following:
Robert H. Bork, "Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare," 77
Yale Law Journal 950 (1968); Ward S. Bowman, "Prerequisites and Effects
of Resale Price Maintenance," 22 University of Chicago Law Review 825
(1955); William S. Comanor, "Vertical Territorial and Customer .
Restrictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath," 81 Harvard Law Review
1419 (1968); Marvin Frankel, "The Effect of Fair Trade: Fact and
Fiction in the Statistical Findings," 28 Journal of Business 182
(1955); John R. Gould and Basil Yamey, "Professor Bork on Vertical
Price-Fixing," 76 Yale Law Journal 722 (1967); A. P. Hourilian and J.
M. Markham, The Effects of Resale Price Maintenance Repeal; The Case
Study of Rhode Island , Marketing Science Institute, 1974; Lester G.
Telser, "Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?" 3 Journal of Law
and Economics 86 (1960); Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Vertical
Control of Markets , Cambridge: Ballinger, 1978; and Basil S. Yaney,
ed. , Resale Price Maintenance , Chicago, Aldine, 1966; L. A. Engman,
"Case for Repealing 'Fair Trade'," 7 Antitrust Law and Economics Review
79 (1975); R. A. Givens and L. P. Worsinger, "Vertical Restraints After
Repeal of Fair Trade," 45 Fordham Law Review 1093 (1977); and William
L. Holahan, "A Theoretical Analysis of Resale Price Maintenance," 21
Journal of Economic Theory 411 (1979).
For a summary of the criticisms of both the retailer-cartel and
manufacturer-cartel theories see Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox,
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New York: Basic Books, 1978, p. 290 ff. For a recent, equally elegant,
discussion of these same issues, see Holahan, op» cit. , n. 4.
See Telser, op. cit . , n. 4. Similar issues were raised somewhat
earlier in Ward Bowman, "Resale Price Maintenance: A Monopoly Problem,"
25 J. Bus. 141 (1952) and in Bowman, op. cit. , n. 4.
In the remainder of this note I refer to all of the retailer-
supplied services under the expression "product quality information."
Q
An exception is Robert H. Bork, op. cit. , supra , n. 4. In what
follows we should not discuss the effects of resale price maintenance
on inter-brand competition.
'See Michael E. Porter, "Consumer Behavior, Retailer Power and
Market Performance in Consumer Goods Industries," Review of Economics *'
and Statistics 56 (1974).
We are concerned here with product quality information as provided
by retailers in the form of point-of-sale services. In the spirit of
the retailer service theory, we assume that retailers can, ideally,
provide this information more cheaply than consumers can provide it for
themselves. Thus, all combinations along the budget line AB in figure 1
are least-cost combinations between physical product and retailer-provided
product quality information. Combinations between physical product and
consumer-provided product quality information would lie below AB.
Figure 4 also has new budget line DB, reflecting an increase in
the relative price of the physical product. Budget line GH accomplishes
much the same thing as does DB with some increased ease of exposition.
The substance of the analysis is not altered under either GH or DB since
both reflect the essential point noted here, viz., that resale price
-16-
maintenance alters the relative price of physical product and product
quality information.
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